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Abstract
We analyze the role of professional reputation in the transition to entrepreneurial activity when
credit is rationed. We study an employee￿ s willingness to allow the market to learn information
about talent by choosing more or less informative projects. This choice impacts the employee￿ s
incentives to exert e⁄ort, which determines the wage, and in turn the cash to be invested in the
business venture. We show that reputation and cash are substitutes in overcoming credit rationing.
However, maintaining a good reputation con￿ icts with accumulating cash. Hence, employees adopt
a di⁄erent strategy depending on their initial reputation. Besides, starting a business venture early
can in expectation be easier than waiting in order to build a reputation and accumulate cash.
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1I. Introduction
According to a 1989 International Social Survey Progamme, self-employment was a goal for 63%
of Americans, 48% of British people and 49% of Germans (Blanch￿ ower and Oswald, 1990). However,
only a mere 15% of those surveyed achieve the objective of running their own company. Respondents
to this survey emphasize that a major roadblock to their goal is the di¢ culty in obtaining funding.
In this paper, we analyze how credit rationing a⁄ects the transition from being a wage-earner to
entrepreneurial activity. We restrict our attention to industries where human capital is particularly
valuable, for example, biotechnology, information technology, law, accountancy, and consultancy. We
address several key questions. Can professional reputation in the labor market help to establish an
entrepreneurial ￿rm? Is professional reputation a substitute for cash resources, and therefore a solution
to the credit rationing problem? Is improving or preserving professional reputation compatible with
maximizing cash resources? When these two objectives con￿ ict, which alternative should a prospective
entrepreneur favor? Finally, we analyze the trade-o⁄ between starting a ￿rm early in a career versus
delaying this goal to establish a good professional reputation and accumulate ￿nancial resources.
We utilize the followings to obtain our results. Consider a risk-neutral, cash-poor, professional, for
example a scientist, who is endowed with a business idea and human capital. A ￿nancial investment is
required to determine whether this business idea, based on a new technology, can be transformed into
a feasible project. Innovation and the associated pro￿ts last one period since other ￿rms can enter the
market or adopt the same production process. There is a moral hazard problem since the scientist can
pursue personal objectives that hurt the pro￿tability of the business. This moral hazard problem induces
credit rationing so that a positive-NPV idea is not necessarily funded. Alternatively, the scientist can
use an existing technology with less potential but which does not require further ￿nancial investment.
However, running the existing technology requires additional personal e⁄ort that is not observable, and
2requires managerial decisions that are not observable when made, but are observable ex post although
not veri￿able1. More speci￿cally, the prospective entrepreneur faces the choice of whether to undertake
an action that is more or less informative about his talent. Examples are abundant (see Hirshleifer,
1993, for a discussion): Ventures whose outcomes are resolved soon rather than in the distant future
are informative actions: In the latter case, the outcome that arrives at an interim date is a very noisy
measure of the ￿nal outcome. Taking part to a transversal project whose success depends on a team￿ s
capability rather than on an individual￿ s sole performances is an opaque action. Advancing the arrival
of news regarding the success of a product by increasing the expenditures that enable the development
of the product is more informative an action than increasing basic research activity2.
Both the output from using an existing technology and the scientist￿ s output as a developer of
new technology depend on the level of the scientist￿ s talent. This level of talent is unknown, that is,
information is incomplete but symmetric. Nevertheless, the labor market forms priors about talent,
for example, by taking into account education, so that the scientist has a reputation. The new idea
is pro￿table whatever the scientist￿ s assessed talent if the scientist maximizes pro￿ts. Scientists can
be employed either as wage earners or entrepreneurs. Wages earners receive a ￿xed salary, whereas
entrepreneurs are residual claimants of the cash-￿ ows they generate.
In the absence of moral hazard problem, the scientist would maximize pro￿ts, would be able to
obtain ￿nancing on the credit market and would be indi⁄erent to being a wage earner versus an
entrepreneur. The scientist would exert the ￿rst-best level of e⁄ort in the second period when the
formerly-new technology becomes an existing technology. This constitutes our benchmark.
The presence of moral hazard has an important impact on the results. We show that becoming
an entrepreneur allows the scientist to obtain an additional gain relative to what he would earn as an
1This assumption is in line with Hermalin (1993). Alternative assumptions are discussed in the last section of the
paper.
2In other contexts, ventures whose outcomes are outside the manager￿ s control, for example a foreign investment subject
to political risk, are opaque actions. Indeed, such projects tend to provide less resolution of uncertainty about the talent
of the manager than projects whose outcomes depend less on external factors than on the manager￿talent.
3employee, since the scientist now has more powerful incentives as a residual claimant to maximize cash-
￿ ows. We show that a scientist has the opportunity to start a business venture in the ￿rst period with
su¢ cient reputation. This case stands in contrast to the benchmark case where reputation is irrelevant
since projects are pro￿table per se. The reason for this di⁄erence is that the better the scientist￿ s
reputation, the larger the di⁄erence in revenue between pursuing personal objectives and maximizing
pro￿ts, which fosters incentives.
A scientist can alternatively start a business venture in the second period provided that his updated
reputation at the end of the ￿rst period is adequate and that he has su¢ cient ￿nancial resources from
saving ￿rst-period salary for the business venture. Indeed, reputation and cash make it easier to satisfy
the incentive compatibility constraint when starting a business venture. Professional reputation and
cash resources appear to be substitutes. However, while all scientists share the same objectives of
enhancing their reputation, (i.e., they have career concerns) and their ￿rst-period salary, these two
goals can con￿ ict. Opting for the less informative action prevents the market from updating reputation
e¢ ciently, which lowers the incentives to exert e⁄ort. Thus, choosing the less informative action reduces
the scientist￿ s output, his wage rate, and in turn the potential ￿nancial contribution he can make to the
future business venture. We identify di⁄erent behaviors that depend on the scientist￿ s initial reputation.
When reputation is high, the scientist is induced to maintain this reputation, that is undertaking the
less informative action at the expense of accumulating more resources. The scientist cannot commit
to work hard and thus receives a low wage. In contrast, a scientist with a lower reputation bene￿ts
from choosing the more informative action. This more informative action helps the market to update
its views of the scientist￿ s talent and induces the scientist to work more, and thus to accumulate more
￿nancial resources, which facilitates future access to credit. Finally, even though waiting allows the
scientist to accumulate cash, we show that starting a business venture early can be easier than waiting
for the second period. It disciplines the scientist by internalizing the second-period gains of using a
4technology since the scientist is residual claimant of the cash-￿ ows.
There are several bodies of literature that relate to the paper. The ￿rst one is research on entre-
preneurship, although there is little consensus about the term entrepreneur. Some empirical studies
use business ownership to de￿ne entrepreneurs (Cargetti and De Nardi, 2001; Gentry and Hubbard,
2001), whereas others use self-employment (Evans and Leighton, 1989; Evans and Jovanovic, 1989;
Blanch￿ ower and Oswald, 1998; Fairlie, 1999), or both criteria (Meyer, 1990; Quadrini, 1999; Hurst
and Lusardi, 2004)3. We do not make the distinction between the two criteria so that in our study, the
entrepreneur is self-employed and owns the business. There also exists a debate about the functions
an entrepreneur performs. The controversy dates to Knight (1921) and Schumpeter (1934). Knight,
and later Kihlstrom and La⁄ont (1979), view the entrepreneur as performing the ￿peculiar twofold
function of (a) exercising responsible control and (b) securing the owners of productive services against
uncertainty and ￿ uctuation in their incomes￿ 4. In contrast, Schumpeter5 asserts that ￿the entrepre-
neur is never a risk bearer,￿but an innovator. Baumol (1986) views entrepreneurs as individuals who
respond to the opportunities of creating new products. The pursuit of business opportunities is stressed
by Rosen (1983) who considers entrepreneurship as ￿exploiting the new opportunities that inventions
provide, more in the form of marketing and developing them for the widespread use in the economy
than developing the knowledge itself.￿This view is developed further by Holmes and Schmitz (1990)
who investigate the incentives to invest in entrepreneurial skills. Entrepreneurs can be contrasted with
specialists (Lazear, 2002) since they may have a comparative disadvantage in a single skill, but more
balanced talents that span a variety of di⁄erent skills. Recently, entrepreneurs have been viewed as
di⁄erent from other individuals because of their optimism (Amador and Landier, 2003, and Landier
and Thesmar, 2004).
3Considering Schedule C in US federal income tax returns is another possibility (e.g., Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen,
1994).
4Kihlstrom and La⁄ont (1979), page XX.
5Quoted by Kihlstrom and La⁄ont (1979) on page XX.
5In our paper, an entrepreneur is the residual claimant of the cash-￿ ows generated, whereas an
employee receives a ￿xed wage and thus bears no risk. However, this is the consequence of the inability
to write employment contracts contingent on output, rather than of a desire to protect workers from
￿ uctuations in their incomes, since all participants are risk-neutral in our setting. The entrepreneur is
neither optimistic nor pessimistic and all individuals are su¢ ciently innovative and capable of observing
business opportunities and exploiting them pro￿tably. Such individuals are responsible for conceiving
the basic product, hiring the initial team, and obtaining ￿nancing, but their lack of reputation or
personal resources can prevent them from undertaking this entrepreneurial activity. In focusing on
reputation as a tool to relax credit constraints, we restrict our attention to the case of industries where
human capital is particularly crucial, and can be transferred from employee activity to entrepreneurial
activity.
One stream of entrepreneurship literature focuses on the transition from wage earner activity to
entrepreneurial activity. In our model, the motive for the transition is that the scientist enjoys an
additional gain compared to what would be earned as a wage worker once a business opportunity is
discovered that is worth exploiting. However, several non-pecuniary reasons also explain the desire
to become an entrepreneur (Blanch￿ ower and Oswald, 1990; Hamilton, 2000; Moskowitz and Vissing-
Jorgensen, 2002). In addition to the psychological satisfaction from making important decisions, that
is, being one￿ s boss, entrepreneurship satis￿es ego as it enhances social status. Embracing an entre-
preneurial career also has private bene￿ts such as the ability to control one￿ s work schedule, and other
perks. Our results apply provided that the transition to entrepreneurship creates a discontinuity in
the employee￿ s revenue function, irrespective of the reasons that motivate the employee to become an
entrepreneur.
A central feature of our model is the role of personal ￿nancial assets. In this respect, our paper
is related to the literature on credit rationing. It has been widely documented that having cash
6resources is helpful in overcoming the credit rationing problem for would-be entrepreneurs (Evans and
Jovanovich, 1989; Evans and Leighton, 1989; Meyer, 1990; Blanch￿ ower and Oswald, 1990; Holtz-Eakin,
Joulfaian and Rosen, 1994, or Audretsch and Vivarelli, 1995). Theoretical arguments are also abundant
(Holmstr￿m and Tirole, 1997). Cash resources are usually in the form of inheritance or family assets,
and wages saved. Most of the above empirical literature focuses on inheritance and family assets which
are viewed as exogenous positive liquidity shocks and thus represent a form of natural experiment,
facilitating the interpretation of the results concerning the transition to entrepreneurship. In contrast,
we focus on wages since they are determined endogenously and interact with the other variable of
interest, reputation. Also, higher wages increase the likelihood that wage workers become entrepreneurs
(Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and Rosen, 1994), although Evans and Jovanovich (1989) report that wage
workers receiving low salaries are more likely to become entrepreneurs because lower wages increase the
attractiveness of entrepreneurship. However, it is important to note that the above studies consider a
broad range of industries, whereas we focus on activities where reputational capital is important.
Our paper is also related to the literature that studies how to build a reputation, and the impact of
current reputation on managerial or ￿rm choices (Hirshleifer, 1993). Within the context of this paper,
we consider professional reputation and not reputation as a borrower (Diamond, 1989). The asymmet-
ric information literature investigates how managers (or ￿rms) with superior information undertake
￿nancial or real investment decisions, and how the timing of these decisions in￿ uences market percep-
tions (Trueman, 1986; Brennan, 1990; Hirshleifer and Chordia, 1992; Zwiebel, 1995; Prendergast and
Stole, 1996; or Breeden and Viswanathan, 1998). The career concerns literature studies similar issues
but assumes that managers (or ￿rms) and the market possess the same information about managerial
talent and ￿rm characteristics6. Managers exert e⁄ort to in￿ ate their output (Holmstr￿m, 1982, 1999),
alter the accuracy of the information that accrues to the market by herding (Scharfstein and Stein,
6We refer the reader to Dewatripont, Jewitt and Tirole (1999, part I) for a very general and extensive treatment of
career concerns.
71990), hedging (DeMarzo and Du¢ e, 1995), choosing the risk of the project they realize (Holmstr￿m,
1982, 1999; Hermalin, 1993), avoiding projects that would reveal information about their talent (Holm-
str￿m and Ricart I Costa, 1986), or by increasing short-term pro￿ts at the expense of long-term pro￿ts
(Narayanan, 1985). Here, we focus on career concerns, and assume that information is symmetric
about talent. Our paper di⁄ers from this literature since information is symmetric in order to study
the interaction between e⁄ort and project (or actions) choices, and between reputation and cash.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we introduce the model and discuss assumptions.
In Section III, we determine the conditions under which a scientist can establish a ￿rm in the ￿rst or
in the second period, and investigate the solutions. In Section IV, we discuss robustness issues, derive
implications and propose extensions of our work. Concluding remarks follow.
II. The Model
We consider a two-period model with a competitive labor market consisting of ￿rms and scientists,
and a competitive credit market. All parties are risk-neutral and protected by limited liability. At the
beginning of the ￿rst period, each scientist is endowed with an idea (a new product or a new process)
but has no personal wealth (A = 0). The scientist￿ s precise talent ￿ is unknown to market partici-
pants, including the scientist himself. It is common knowledge that ￿ is drawn from the distribution
N(E(￿);￿2
￿), where E(￿) ￿ 0 represents the scientist￿ s initial reputation.
If the scientist is employed by a ￿rm (Figure 1), then either the ￿rm￿ s existing technology is used
or a business venture is started based on the new idea. If the scientist is self-employed, the business
venture must be started based on the new idea. Laws protecting intellectual property prevent stealing
the ￿rms￿existing technologies.
II.A. Employee versus Self-employed Activity
8Whether an employee or self-employed, the scientist generates cash-￿ ows observable by everyone.
However, we do not use this observable output in employer-employee formal compensation contracts
for several reasons. First, implicit incentives are powerful, even in the presence of explicit contracts so
that it is worth studying implicit incentives per se (Gibbons and Murphy, 1992). Second, even though
the use of explicit incentives is widespread (Murphy, 1998; Gibbons and Murphy, 1992), the explicit
incentives that confront executives in large ￿rms are weak (Jensen and Murphy, 1990). Indeed, there
exist restraints on the use of explicit incentives, in particular the di¢ culty of verifying the output of
each employee. Finally, some regulated industries, government agencies (notably those in charge with
developing military innovations), and universities (which house scienti￿c laboratories) are prevented
from or avoid resorting to explicit incentive schemes. Since an employee￿ s wage cannot be contingent
on observed output, the employee is paid a ￿xed wage Wi at the end of period i (with i = 1;2). This
wage is ￿xed at the beginning of the period.
A self-employed scientist is a residual claimant of the cash-￿ ows generated so that his period i



















Figure 1: Transition to entrepreneurial activity and choice
of technology.
9II.B. New Idea versus Existing Technology
Using existing technology yields
￿i(￿;rai;ei) = ￿ + rai + ei; (1)
where ￿ is the scientist￿ s talent, rai denotes the cash-￿ ows resulting from action ai undertaken during
period i, and ei is the e⁄ort exerted by the scientist during this period. The scientist faces two decisions.
First, the scientist must choose an action in the set fT ;Og, where O stands for opaque and T stands
for transparent. Whatever period is considered, action T yields some cash-￿ ows, rT , drawn from the
distribution N(0;￿2
T ), while action O yields rO s N(0;￿2
O), with ￿2
O > ￿2
T . Hence, actions have
no direct impact on the expected cash-￿ ows. The action selected is not observable by the market at
the time the decision is made, but is observable, although not veri￿able, by the market at the end of
the period. This assumption, substantiated by Hermalin (1993), implies that no contract is written
contingent on the scientist￿ s decision. The scientist chooses the level of e⁄ort ei to exert which translates
into cash-￿ ows ei for any period under consideration, and costs  (ei), with  0 > 0 and  00 > 0.
Starting a business venture based on a new idea requires a ￿nancial investment I. This investment,
for example R&D, is necessary to learn whether the idea will result in a feasible business project. Let ￿
represent the attractiveness of the new product or process, with ￿ > ￿, as speci￿ed in the Appendix.
The cash-￿ ows are equal to
￿i(￿;￿)=￿ + ￿ if the project is feasible
=0 if the project is not feasible. (2)
The scientist in￿ uences the probability that the project is feasible. If the scientist pursues personal
objectives (for example, by not allocating time properly across di⁄erent tasks, or by hiring family
10members with poor quali￿cations), the probability of feasibility is q (with q < 1) while the scientist
receives a non-monetary and non-transferable private bene￿t B as is standard (see Holmstr￿m and
Tirole, 1997). In contrast, if the scientist pursues pro￿t maximization, the probability of feasibility
is 17. We assume that talent aside, the starting of a business venture requires pro￿t maximization in
order to be pro￿table, so that
￿ ￿ I > 0 > q￿ ￿ I + B: (3)
When feasible, the new idea yields ￿ during one period only. In the next period, there is competition
and other ￿rms enter the same market or adopt the same process so that ￿ falls to zero. Thus, the
￿new￿idea becomes an ￿existing￿technology, the output of which is given by (1). If unsuccessful in
exploiting the idea in period 1, the scientist is employed by a ￿rm in the next period, runs the ￿rm￿ s
existing technology, and earns W2.
To simplify matters, a would-be entrepreneur only contracts with investors over one period, i.e.,
there cannot be any long-term contract.
III. Starting a Business Venture
We ￿rst establish our benchmark in the absence of any moral hazard problem. Then, we derive the
conditions under which a scientist can start a business venture in the ￿rst period and in the second
period when moral hazard problems are present. We then compare these two cases.
III.A. The Benchmark
If actions, choices and e⁄orts are contractible, but information about talent incomplete, a scientist
would start a business venture based on new technology in the ￿rst period, and run the formerly new
7This is without loss of generality: Since scientists are protected by limited liability, inducing them to maximize the
cash-￿ ows requires the design of an incentive mechanism even if the fact that the project turns out not to be feasible
perfectly reveals that the scientist shirked. Indeed, the latter cannot be sent to jail.
11now-existing technology in the second period. The ￿rst-period expected gains would be [E(￿) + ￿ ￿ I]
(see (2)) and the second-period expected gains
￿
E(￿) + eFB ￿  (eFB)
￿
(see (1)), where eFB denotes the
￿rst-best level of e⁄ort.8 Naturally, eFB satis￿es  0(eFB) = 1. The choice of action would be irrelevant
since on average actions yield the same cash-￿ ows. Using an existing technology during the two periods
would yield less, on average 2 ￿
￿
E(￿) + eFB ￿  (eFB)
￿
, since ￿ > ￿. Observe that the scientist is
indi⁄erent between starting the business venture as an entrepreneur and as an employee.
III.B. Starting a Business Venture in the First Period
Suppose that the scientist is considering starting a business venture immediately. We ￿rst restrict
our attention to the case where maximizing cash-￿ ows is necessary to have a positive NPV so that the
scientist￿ s incentive compatibility constraint must be satis￿ed. This requires that the expected gains
over the two periods when the scientist maximizes pro￿ts must be greater than the gains obtained when
there is a private bene￿t. In the former case, the new idea turns out to be feasible with certainty. Thus,
in expectation, the scientist receives E(￿)+￿ in the ￿rst period, but pays D to the provider of funds in
exchange for the ￿nancial investment, I ￿ A. In the second period, the scientist runs the formerly new
now-existing technology and is a residual claimant of the cash-￿ ows generated. Hence, the scientist
exerts the ￿rst-best level of e⁄ort eFB
2 and accordingly incurs disutility  (eFB
2 ). The choice of action
is irrelevant since there are no career concerns and actions yield the same expected cash-￿ ows.
If the scientist pursues personal objectives, the probability of obtaining the above gains decreases
to q. With probability 1 ￿ q, the idea turns out not to be feasible and the scientist terminates the
business venture. In the next period, the scientist is hired by a ￿rm to run an existing technology as an
employee. In this case, the scientist exerts no e⁄ort as career concerns are absent in the second period.
For the same reason, the choice of action is irrelevant. Hence, the scientist earns E(￿) in expectation.
8Delaying the start of the venture to the second period would overall yield the same gains, but in an inverted order.
When indi⁄erent between starting immediately and waiting, we consider that the scientist opts for the ￿rst solution. This
result can be obtained by assuming that there is a discount factor.
12As a consequence, the scientist￿ s incentive compatibility constraint reduces to
[E(￿) + ￿ ￿ D] +
￿
eFB







Competitive investors will provide funds if
D = I ￿ A: (5)
Combining (4) and (5), given A = 0 since the scientist has no initial wealth, reduces to










Equation (6) shows that contributing human capital is essential to overcoming the credit rationing




2 ￿  (eFB
2 )
￿
> 0. The intuition for this result is that the higher
the scientist￿ s reputation, the larger the di⁄erence in his revenue between pursuing personal objectives
versus maximizing pro￿ts, which fosters incentives. This result is in contrast to the case where choices,
e⁄orts, and actions are contractible, the benchmark in which professional reputation is useless since
the business venture is pro￿table whatever the scientist￿ s expected talent.
Overall, the scientist is richer as an entrepreneur receiving [E(￿) + ￿ ￿ I]+
￿
E(￿) + eFB
2 ￿  (eFB
2 )
￿
in expectation, rather than deciding to remain an employee of a ￿rm using an existing technology. In
such a case, the ￿rst-period gain is equal to the wage set by the competitive labor market at E(￿)+e￿
1,
where e￿
1 denotes the ￿rst-period equilibrium level of e⁄ort, minus the cost of e⁄ort  (e￿
1), while the
second-period gain is equal to the wage E(￿). Since I < ￿, and the level of e⁄ort does not correspond to
the ￿rst-best in the latter case, [E(￿) + ￿ ￿ I]+
￿
E(￿) + eFB
2 ￿  (eFB
2 )
￿
> [E(￿) + e￿
1 ￿  (e￿
1)]+E(￿).
The scientist is also better o⁄ starting a business venture immediately rather than waiting for the
second period.
Note that a scientist could also start a business venture as an employee. By de￿nition in our model,
an employee￿ s salary is ￿xed. Hence, the scientist would not maximize pro￿ts. As a consequence, the
expected NPV would be q [(E(￿) + ￿)] ￿ I. This NPV is positive, and the business venture could be
13started by the employee, to the extent that the employee￿ s updated reputation is higher than I
q ￿ ￿.
Observe that the same condition holds for a scientist willing to become an entrepreneur but who pursues
personal goals. However, since q￿ ￿ I + B < 0 (see the second part in (3)), the scientist is better o⁄
running the existing technology. The next proposition summarizes these results.
Proposition 1 A scientist starts a business venture based on a new technology in the ￿rst period as
an entrepreneur if the scientist￿ s initial reputation satis￿es










Otherwise, the scientist remains an employee running an existing technology.
In the next section, we consider a scientist who delays the transition to entrepreneurial activity to
the second period.
III.C. Starting a Business Venture in the Second Period
We now focus on a scientist who waits until the second period to try to implement a new idea in
order to accumulate cash and keep or enhance his reputation. Depending on reputation, and working
backward, we determine the level of e⁄ort and derive the action opted for. Finally, we compare the
di¢ culty of starting a business venture early versus later.
1. Reputation and Cash
Let E(￿ j ￿1;e￿
1;a1) represent the scientist￿ s updated reputation, that is, the assessment that the
market makes about the scientist￿ s talent by taking into account the information that accrues at the end
of the ￿rst period, i.e., the observed output as an employee, ￿1, the anticipated ￿rst-period equilibrium
e⁄ort, e￿
1, and the ￿rst-period observed action, a1. Note that in the second period, the scientist￿ s
￿nancial contribution to the business venture is strictly positive: Although the scientist had no initial
14wealth, he earns W1 while serving as an employee. Since investors are competitive, the scientist can
start a business venture provided that
E(￿ j ￿1;a1;e￿




Thus, when W1 < I ￿ ￿ + B
1￿q, contributing ￿nancial capital only is not compatible with starting a
business venture. Again, reputation is necessary when important informational issues arise, whereas it
is useless in the benchmark case.
Interestingly, (7) shows that reputation and cash are substitutes. When the mix of the two is high
enough, the scientist is induced to maximize pro￿ts and the business venture can be funded. This leads
to the following proposition.
Proposition 2 Reputation and cash are substitutes in overcoming the credit rationing problem.
We now detail the scientist￿ s ￿rst-period choices when working as an employee.
2. The Scientist￿ s First-Period Choice of E⁄ort as an Employee
Since e⁄ort is costly, unobservable, and does not increase the ￿rst-period wage (which is ￿xed at
the beginning of the period), the scientist exerts e1 solely to favorably in￿ uence the learning process
regarding talent, and in turn second-period gains. However, as in traditional models of career concerns
(Holmstr￿m, 1982, 1999), the market anticipates these e⁄orts in equilibrium and draws the correct
inference about talent from the observed output. Denote ￿ as the threshold above which the scientist￿ s
updated reputation allows him to start a business venture. Then, the gains in expectation are equal to






entist can start a business venture and the expected gains in such a case, [E[E(￿ j ￿1;a1;e￿
1)] + (￿ ￿ I)].
Note that the ￿rst expectation in E[E(￿ j ￿1;a1;e￿
1)] is with respect to ￿1 while the second expectation
is with respect to ￿. Second, the product of the probability that the scientist remains an employee







, and the expected wage in such a case,
15E[E(￿ j ￿1;a1;e￿
1)], net of the cost of the e⁄ort. Observe that the employee-scientist is indi⁄erent be-
tween the two actions in the second period for the same reason as he exerts no e⁄ort: Career concerns







￿ (￿ ￿ I): (8)
Suppose that the market anticipates the equilibrium e⁄ort e￿
1. The scientist chooses e1 so as to maximize
the second-period expected gains given by (8) minus the ￿rst-period cost of e⁄ort,   (e1). Assuming





























￿ (￿ ￿ I) =  0 (e￿
1): (9)
The ￿rst term in the left-hand side of (9) is the marginal return to e⁄ort due to the incentives related
to the pro￿ts ￿1 through the updating process. The second term represents the marginal return to
e⁄ort due to the expected additional revenue the scientist earns when starting a business venture9.
Equation (9) has a major implication: The higher ￿2
a1, the variance in the cash-￿ ows related to an
action, the lower the level of e⁄ort exerted by the scientist. Indeed, the updating process is impaired
when ￿2
a1 increases in the sense that the variance of performance becomes less informative about talent
so that exerting e⁄ort has a less positive impact on the scientist￿ s updated reputation. It induces the
scientist to undertake a lower level of e⁄ort when opting for O rather than for T.
Lemma 1 The equilibrium level of e⁄ort e￿
1 is decreasing in ￿2
a1.
As a consequence, the scientist earns a lower wage when choosing the opaque action, which dimin-
ishes the cash resources the scientist can contribute to the business venture in the next period. This
e⁄ect is reinforced by (￿ ￿ I). In other words, the wage gap between the two actions is widened by
the attractiveness of the new idea.
9The impact of the opportunity to create a ￿rm is that the scientist in our model always exerts more e⁄ort than the
manager in Holmstr￿m￿ s (1982, 1999) model does.
16Combining (7) and (9) allows us to characterize the minimum updated reputation that the scientist
must have in order to start the business venture. Besides, the scientist is better o⁄ becoming an
entrepreneur rather than remaining an employee running the existing technology. In such a case, the
scientist receives a wage equal to the second-period expected output, E(￿ j ￿1;a1;e￿
1). This wage is
lower than the revenue he would have as an entrepreneur since I < ￿. The scientist could also start
a business venture as an employee or be willing to become an entrepreneur pursuing personal goals.
However, as above, the scientist is then better o⁄ running the existing technology. This leads to the
following proposition.
Proposition 3 A scientist starts a business venture based on new technology in the second period as
an entrepreneur provided that the scientist￿ s updated reputation satis￿es
E(￿ j ￿1;a1;e￿
1) ￿ ￿;
where ￿ is the smallest value of x which veri￿es
x = I ￿ ￿ +
B
1 ￿ q
































Otherwise, the scientist remains an employee running an existing technology.
Importantly, ￿ depends on the scientist￿ s ￿rst-period choice of action. Since the scientist receives a
higher wage by choosing the more informative action rather than the less informative action (cf. Lemma
1), the scientist has more money to put up-front in the second period in the former case, so that less
reputation is needed to start a business venture. We summarize this result in the next corollary.
Corollary 1 A scientist needs a lower reputation to start a business venture based on new technology
in the second period as an entrepreneur when opting for the more informative action in the ￿rst period:
￿T < ￿O.
We now derive the scientist￿ s choice of action.
173. The Scientist￿ s First-Period Choice of Action as an Employee
Deriving the scientist￿ s choice of action allows us to distinguish between three cases, depending on
initial reputation. Suppose ￿rst that the scientist￿ s initial reputation is such that E(￿) ￿ ￿O. Then, the
scientist is able to start a business venture if the status quo persists. Thus, choosing O and being paid
WO is an equilibrium, that we denote (O;WO). Indeed, opting for O maximizes the probability to start
a business venture since the updating process is impaired by more extraneous noise than if the scientist
opts for T , and also implies that less e⁄ort is exerted. Choosing T and being paid WT cannot be an
equilibrium. Indeed, if the employers anticipate that the scientist opts for T , and pay WT , the relevant
benchmark would be ￿T with ￿T < ￿O, which is good for the scientist. However, since the salary is
already ￿xed, the scientist would opt for O rather than for T since the former choice would imply
revealing less information, which increases the likelihood of starting a business venture, and working
less. Here, the scientist is induced to preserve reputation rather than increasing his resources.
Next, suppose that the scientist￿ s initial reputation veri￿es ￿T < E(￿) < ￿O. Then, (T ; WT )
cannot be an equilibrium for the same reason as above. Now, imagine that the employers anticipate
that the scientist will opt for O, and pay WO so that the relevant benchmark is ￿O. Then, provided
that the attractiveness of establishing a company is high, the scientist faced with a salary of WO would
opt for T so that (O;WO) would not be an equilibrium. Since the labor market is competitive, the
scientist is paid the highest wage, denoted W
￿T <E(￿)<￿O
T , such that E(￿) < ￿(W
￿T <E(￿)<￿O
T ) and the
scientist actually selects T . Then, the scientist can simultaneously increase reputation and maximize
cash resources.
Finally, suppose that the scientist￿ s initial reputation is such that E(￿) ￿ ￿T . Then, (T ;WT ) is
an equilibrium. Indeed, let the employers anticipate that the scientist will opt for T , and thus pay
WT so that the benchmark is ￿T . Choosing O would prevent the market from e¢ ciently updating
the scientist￿ s reputation. It would be detrimental to the scientist as the status quo implies that the
18business venture cannot be started. As ￿ is high, this negative e⁄ect more than o⁄sets the gain derived
from exerting less e⁄ort. Hence, the scientist opts for T . Building a good reputation and accumulating
as many cash resources as possible is compatible. The above results are summarized below.
Lemma 2 The scientist chooses
(i) Action O when E(￿) ￿ ￿O;
(ii) Action T when E(￿) < ￿O.
The next proposition details the relation between reputation and cash.
Proposition 4 Preserving reputation does not allow the scientist to accumulate as many cash resources
as building reputation.
Interestingly, it can be easier to start a business venture immediately rather than, on average, wait
for the second period. In expectation, (7) can be rewritten as
E(￿) + [E(￿) + e￿




This expression is to be compared with (6). Equation (9) shows that when ￿2
￿ is close to zero, that is,
when there is little uncertainty about the scientist￿ s talent, e￿
1 is also close to zero. If, simultaneously,
E(￿) is low, then the left-hand side of (10) can be lower than the left-hand side of (6). There are two
e⁄ects operating here. The ￿discipline￿e⁄ect favors starting the business venture immediately: The
second-period gain when the idea turns out to be feasible helps to discipline the scientist. The ￿cash￿
e⁄ect favors waiting for the second period. Hence, the following proposition.
Proposition 5 On average, it is easier to start a business venture in the ￿rst period rather than in
the second period provided that ￿2
￿ and E(￿) are low.
This result may explain Evans and Leighton￿ s (1989) ￿ndings that the probability of funding a ￿rm
is independent of age and experience.
19In the next section, we ￿rst discuss robustness issues, and derive implications of our work. Finally,
we examine some possible extensions of our model.
IV. Robustness Issues, Implications and Extensions
￿ Continuous investment. We investigate the case where the level of investment I is ￿xed. Our
results would remain qualitatively similar if the ￿rm￿ s size were continuous provided that the
project to be undertaken has a break-even point, e.g., there exists a lower bound on the level
of investment for the idea to be pro￿table. This lower bound would imply the same type of
discontinuity in the revenue function of the scientist as in our ￿xed-investment model. Though
Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen (1994) empirically ￿nd that entrepreneurs are credit rationed
in the sense that they cannot obtain the amount of resources they would like to have to fully
exploit the potential of their idea when they can start their business venture, they also show that
would-be entrepreneurs are credit rationed in the sense that a lack of funds prevent them from
starting a business venture in the ￿rst place.
￿ Optimism. Recent literature on entrepreneurship (Amador and Landier, 2003, and Landier and
Thesmar, 2004) considers that entrepreneurs are optimistic, that is, they overestimate the prob-
ability of success of the new idea or their talent. In terms of the model, scientists endowed with
these psychological characteristics would be more willing to allow the market to learn informa-
tion about their ability, that is, they would favor transparent actions. However, postulating that
entrepreneurs are optimistic would not modify the conclusion that when choosing between two
actions of varying transparency, scientists take into account their position with respect to the
reputation benchmarks we have identi￿ed.
￿ Commitment. In our framework, a scientist with a good initial reputation is forced to keep
that reputation rather than accumulating cash since the scientist cannot commit to select the
20transparent action once the wage is ￿xed. Consider the situation where the choice of action
precedes the date when the salary is set. For example, the scientist can choose a job (or ￿rm),
and jobs (or ￿rms) di⁄er by their degree of exposure in the business press (e.g., ￿rms listed on
the New York Stock Exchange and included in a Dow Jones Index versus private ￿rms). Then,
in choosing a job (or ￿rm), the scientist commits to a degree of transparency. The consequence is
that the scientist faces a trade-o⁄ between preserving reputation and increasing cash resources.
￿ Unobservable choice of action. Suppose that the labor market anticipates one type of action.
If actions are observable and the scientist deviates from the equilibrium, the market changes
the benchmark against which the scientist is evaluated. This is not the case when the action
that is selected is unobservable. Then, the scientist only considers the impact of the action in
terms of additional information released to the market when deciding whether to deviate from
the equilibrium. The scientist does not take into account the cost of exerting more or less e⁄ort
as occurs when the type of action opted for is observable. The consequence is that the scientist
unambiguously chooses the action characterized by a low variance in the cash-￿ ows when his
reputation is high, i.e., the scientist is conservative, and the action characterized by the higher
variance in the cash-￿ ows when initial reputation lies below the higher benchmark, i.e., the
scientist gambles for resurrection.
￿ Inheritance. We have so far assumed that the scientist has no wealth at the beginning of the ￿rst
period. Alternatively, we can consider the case where the scientist has personal funds to contribute
to the project. Inheritances, for instance, constitute exogenous positive liquidity shocks. Thus,
they represent a natural experiment and allow the researcher to investigate empirically the e⁄ect
of an increase in initial wealth on the likelihood of establishing a ￿rm. In this case, the impact for
a scientist who considers starting the business venture immediately is a reduction in the level of
reputation required. For a scientist who waits until the second period, the impact is a reduction
21in both reputation benchmarks. This wealth can alter his relative position in terms of reputation
vis-a-vis the benchmarks. For instance, a scientist who initially falls between the two benchmarks
can end up above these benchmarks after inheriting some wealth. Then, the scientist selects the
opaque action in lieu of the transparent one. Overall, this implies that two scientists with the same
reputation can make di⁄erent choices of action after receiving di⁄erent ￿nancial endowments.
￿ Age or experience in the job. A major implication of career concerns models (Holmstr￿m,
1982, 1999) is that the implicit incentives emerging from the labor market discipline managers as
long as the assessment about their talents is highly uncertain (￿2
￿ is large), that is, at the beginning
of their careers. Thus, it is not surprising to observe that experienced managers or those about to
retire have a higher proportion of explicit incentives in their compensation packages than younger
or less experienced managers. Here, the standard e⁄ect is also at work: The less established
the reputation of the scientist, the larger the extent to which e⁄ort impacts the market￿ s view
about his talent, and so the more powerful are implicit incentives (see (9)). However, there exists
an o⁄setting e⁄ect that only impacts the probability of earning a higher revenue. For a given
additional unit of the scientist￿ s talent, the higher ￿2
￿, the lower the increase in the probability
of ￿rm creation, and thus, the lesser the incentives to exert e⁄ort. More generally, suppose it is
possible to empirically separate managers facing discontinuities in their revenue functions from
managers facing standard career concerns. Then, one should observe that the former have less
explicit incentives than the latter in their compensation packages.
￿ Partially asymmetric information about talent. Until now, we have not distinguished
between the di⁄erent ways in which the scientist can start a business venture. Assume that part
of the scientist￿ s talent is observable only to the current employer and not to the market as a whole.
For instance, either collaborating with the scientist grants the employer free access to privileged
information, or this access is costly and the employer must design an appropriate monitoring
22policy. If information is asymmetric, the scientist will face more severe credit constraints when
accessing outside ￿nanciers than when obtaining funds internally, such as by taking part in an
internal corporate venture capital program within which the scientist is responsible for the business
venture. However, the scientist then must share the gains derived from an internal innovation
with the current employer. This trade-o⁄ should in￿ uence the scientist￿ s willingness to start the
business venture with or without any link to the current employer: The more asymmetric the
information is, the more likely the business venture will be funded internally.
￿ Endogenous attractiveness of the business opportunity. Imagine that the choice of action
we consider in this paper is reduced to a choice of risk regarding the strategy of the R&D policy
of the ￿rm, and that the scientist can utilize his employment period to improve the initial idea
or ￿nd another valuable one. Then, the scientist has a call option on the outcome of the R&D
policy, with the fraction of the results that the scientist can appropriate depending on the laws
protecting intellectual property or on the severity of non-competition contractual clauses. If the
scientist discovers some invention or a new way to discover some invention, he bene￿ts from the
opportunity to utilize these ￿ndings by creating a new ￿rm, and thus bene￿ts from the upside
potential of the R&D policy. If the R&D policy is a failure, the scientist stays with the ￿rm and
continues to run the existing technology. The value of this option increases with the volatility of
the R&D policy. Reinterpreting our results against the backdrop of this option framework should
not alter them qualitatively, but would bias the scientist￿ s choice towards the riskier action.
IV. Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we analyze the role of professional reputation in the transition from employee activ-
ity to entrepreneurial activity when credit is rationed. Establishing a new ￿rm allows our would-be
23entrepreneur to capture the pro￿ts related to an innovation. Without moral hazard, the would-be en-
trepreneur would start the business venture in the ￿rst period, whatever the level of reputation. When
there are moral hazard problems, the prospective entrepreneur can start a business venture immediately
provided that his reputation is high enough. If it is impossible, the would-be entrepreneur can work
as an employee during a ￿rst period, then undertake an action or a project that will be more or less
informative regarding talent, and unobservable and costly e⁄ort is exerted. When considering these two
choice variables, all would-be entrepreneurs share the common objective of maximizing their reputation
and their cash. However, these two goals can con￿ ict. Opting for the less informative project has four
related consequences. First, it prevents the market from updating reputation e¢ ciently. Second, it
lowers the productivity of the scientist. Third, it decreases the wage. Fourth, it diminishes the cash
that will be available to invest in the future business venture. When their reputation is high, would-be
entrepreneurs are induced to maintain this reputation rather than increasing their resources. Since they
cannot commit to work hard (they undertake the less informative project), they receive a low wage.
Conversely, would-be entrepreneurs with a lower reputation bene￿t from choosing the more informative
project, since it encourages the market to change its beliefs regarding their talents, and induces them
to work hard, allowing them to accumulate the ￿nancial resources that later facilitate their access to
credit. Finally, we show that starting a business venture early can be easier than waiting to accumulate
￿nancial capital.
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last three terms are speci￿ed below in the proof of Lemma 2.
I. Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose that the market anticipates e￿







￿ (￿ ￿ I) ￿   (e1); (11)
where the ￿rst expectation is with respect to ￿1, and the second expectation is with respect to ￿.
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￿ (￿ ￿ I) =  0 (e￿
1); (13)
where b f (￿1 j ) =
R
f (￿1;￿ j )d￿ and f (￿1;￿ j ) denote respectively the marginal density of the ob-
servables, and the joint density of the talent and of the observables, given e￿
1 and a1. b fe denotes the
derivative of the marginal distribution with respect to e⁄ort.
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25Now consider the second part on the left-hand side of (13). Applying statistic rules for computing a














































































































=  0 (e￿
1): (18)




a < 0 since
￿
 0￿1￿0 = 1
 00( 0￿1) > 0 as  00 > 0. Hence, e￿
1(T ) > e￿
1(O).
II Proof of Proposition 3
A scientist can start a business venture based on a new idea in the second period if
E(￿ j ￿1;a1;e￿




We have W1 = E(￿) + e￿
1, where e￿
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Therefore, a scientist can create a ￿rm in the next period if E(￿ j ￿1;a1;e￿
1) ￿ ￿, where ￿ is the smallest
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O) > h(￿T ;￿2
T ) = ￿T : Moreover, using (20) and the fact that g is increasing in x, we
obtain ￿O > ￿T , where ￿a1 denotes the threshold above which the scientist can start a business venture
when opting for action a1.
Since h(x;￿2
a) is strictly decreasing in x when x < E(￿) and strictly increasing in x when x > E(￿)



































































27implies that ￿ > E(￿).
III Proof of Lemma 2








1): Since the market perfectly anticipates e￿




1)] = E(￿), the scientist makes a choice of action by considering (i) the cost of e⁄ort
implied by the action and (ii) the probability of starting a business venture. Observe that when making
a choice of action, the scientist knows the threshold above which it is possible to start a business venture
since W1 is already ￿xed.
1. Let E(￿) ￿ ￿O. First, (18) shows that minimizing   (e1) implies to maximize ￿2
a, hence to opt for
O. Next, examine the probability. Using statistic rules for computing conditional expectations










. Thus, raising ￿2
a,
which implies to select O, decreases the variance of E(￿ j ￿1;a1;e￿
1), and in turn maximizes the
probability to be above ￿T and ￿O as E(￿) ￿ ￿O. To summarize, the scientist￿ s dominant strategy
is to choose O. Accordingly, the wage is WO and the relevant threshold is ￿O.
2. Let ￿T < E(￿) < ￿O. Suppose ￿rst that employers anticipate that the scientist will choose T ,
and will pay WT so that ￿ = ￿T . Then, maximizing the probability to start a business venture as
well as minimizing   (e1) drives the scientist to opt for O since E(￿) > ￿T . However, this cannot
be an equilibrium since paying WT = E(￿) + e￿
1(T ) > E(￿) + e￿
1(O) would imply a loss for the
employer. Suppose now that (i) employers anticipate that the scientist will opt for O, and (ii) the
scientist is paid WO so that the relevant threshold is ￿O. Minimizing   (e1) leads the scientist to
choose O. However, this decreases the probability of starting a business venture since E(￿) < ￿O.
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which is not veri￿ed here since ￿ > ￿. Hence, (O, WO) is not an equilibrium. As observed above,
paying the scientist WT cannot be an equilibrium since the employer would then incur a loss.
Paying the scientist WO < E(￿) + e￿
1(T) is not an equilibrium either since ￿rms are competitive.
Thus, the scientist receives W
￿T <E(￿)<￿O
T ￿ WO, where W
￿T <E(￿)<￿O
T is the highest possible wage
such that (i) ￿ is higher than E(￿), where ￿ is the smallest value of E(￿ j ￿1;T;e￿
1) such that (19)
is veri￿ed with W
￿T <E(￿)<￿O





































































T ) is an equilibrium.
3. Let E(￿) ￿ ￿T ￿ ￿O. It is straightforward that whatever ￿, the scientist maximizes the probability
of starting a business venture by minimizing ￿2
a, i.e. by choosing T . However, choosing T implies
a higher cost of e⁄ort. Hence, the trade-o⁄ the scientist faces. Two cases are possible:
a. Employers anticipate that the scientist will select T and will pay WT so that ￿ = ￿T . This is an
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b. Employers anticipate that the scientist will select O and will pay WO so that ￿ = ￿O. This cannot
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which is not the case since ￿ > ￿.
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